

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., [477 U.S. 242](#), 243, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) http://leagle.com/decision/1986719477US242_1709.xml/ANDERSON%20v.%20LIBERTY%20LOBBY,%20INC.

Rule 56(c) of the FRCP provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion of summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, [477 U.S. 242](#), 243, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)

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“More important for present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. In *First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co.*, [391 U.S. 253](#) (1968)), we affirmed a grant of summary judgment for an antitrust defendant where the issue was whether there was a genuine factual dispute as to the existence of a conspiracy. We noted Rule 56(e)'s provision that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “`may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” We observed further that “[i]t is true that the issue of material fact required by Rule 56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” 391 U. S., at 288-289.

We went on to hold that, in the face of the defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff could not rest on his allegations of a conspiracy to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” *Id.*, at 290.

Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same language in describing genuine factual issues under Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. As *Adickes, supra*, and *Cities Service, supra*, indicate, there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. *Cities Service, supra*, at 288-289. If the evidence is merely colorable, *Dombrowski v. Eastland*, [387 U.S. 82](#) (1967) (*per*

curiam), or is not significantly probative, *Cities Service, supra*, at 290, summary judgment may be granted.

Petitioners suggest, and we agree, that this standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. *Brady v. Southern R. Co.*, [320 U.S. 476](#), 479-480 (1943). If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not be directed. *Wilkerson v. McCarthy*, [336 U.S. 53](#), 62 (1949). As the Court long ago said in *Improvement Co. v. Munson*, 14 Wall. 442, 448 (1872), and has several times repeated:

"Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party. Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a *scintilla* of evidence in support of case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the *onus* of proof is imposed."
(Footnotes omitted.)

See also *Pleasants v. Fant*, 22 Wall. 116, 120-121 (1875); *Coughran v. Bigelow*, [164 U.S. 301](#), 307 (1896); *Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain*, [288 U.S. 333](#), 343 (1933).

The Court has said that summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it "would require a directed verdict for the moving party." *Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp.*, [321 U.S. 620](#), 624 (1944). And we have noted that the "genuine issue" summary judgment standard is "very close" to the "reasonable jury" directed verdict standard: "The primary difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted." *Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB*, [461 U.S. 731](#), 745, n. 11 (1983). In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.

Progressing to the specific issue in this case, we are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is

entitled to a verdict — "whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the *onus* of proof is imposed." *Munson, supra*, at 448.